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Understanding the Costs and Benefits of Deepwater Oil  
Drilling Regulation  
Alan Krupnick, Sarah Campbell, Mark A. Cohen, and Ian W.H. Parry  
Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a conceptual framework for understanding how analysis of 
costs and benefits might be incorporated into an assessment of regulatory policies affecting deepwater 
drilling. We begin by providing a framework for analyzing the life-cycle impacts of oil drilling and its 
alternatives, including onshore drilling and importing oil from abroad. We then provide background 
estimates of the different sources of oil supplied in the United States, look at how other oil supply sources 
might respond to regulations on deepwater drilling, and consider the economic costs of these regulations. 
After providing a comprehensive description of the potential costs and benefits from various types of 
drilling—including, when possible, estimates of the magnitude of these benefits and costs—we discuss 
the extent to which these costs and benefits may already be taken into account (or reinforced) through the 
legal, regulatory, and tax systems and through market mechanisms. We conclude by presenting a 
framework and simple example of how a cost–benefit analysis might be used to inform regulation of 
deepwater drilling, and sum up the policy implications of our work.  
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Understanding the Costs and Benefits of Deepwater Oil  
Drilling Regulation  
Alan Krupnick, Sarah Campbell, Mark A. Cohen, and Ian W.H. Parry 
All findings, opinions, statements, and recommendations contained in this report are solely those of its 
authors. The report has been submitted to the staff of the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil 
Spill and Offshore Drilling, but the report is not the work product of the Commission or its staff, and should not be 
construed in any respect as the official or unofficial findings, opinions, statements, or recommendations of the 
Commission or its staff. 
Executive Summary 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a conceptual framework for understanding how 
costs and benefits might be incorporated into an assessment of regulatory policies affecting 
deepwater drilling, based on the principles of welfare economics. The paper provides 
background estimates of the different sources of oil supplied in the United States, looks at how 
other oil supply sources might respond to regulations on deepwater drilling, and considers the 
economic costs of such regulations. We also provide a comprehensive taxonomy of the potential 
costs and benefits from regulating deepwater drilling (as well as other sources of oil), and when 
possible, provide estimates of the magnitude of these benefits and costs.  
Although we are primarily concerned with damages from deepwater drilling, we note that 
62 percent of all oil found in waters off the North American coast is attributable to slow yet 
chronic releases from natural seeps in the seabed. The remaining 38 percent of oil resulting from 
anthropogenic activity is comprised of three types of activities: extraction (3 percent), 
transportation (10 percent), and consumption (87 percent). Extraction covers platform spills 
(such as the BP Deepwater Horizon spill), wastewater discharge, and atmospheric volatilization 
                                                 
 Krupnick, Senior Fellow and Research Director; Campbell, Research Assistant; Cohen, Vice President for 
Research; and Parry, Allen V. Kneese Senior Fellow, Resources for the Future, Washington, DC. 
DISCLAIMER: This project was funded by the Department of Energy, National Energy Technology Laboratory an 
agency of the United States Government, through a support contract with Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc. Neither the 
United States Government nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, nor Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc., nor 
any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for 
the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents 
that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, 
or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply its 
endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof. The views and 
opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or any 
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(resulting in volatile organic compounds in the air). Extraction activities in North American 
waters account for only 3 percent of anthropogenic oil spills to ocean waters (or 1.2 percent of all 
spills), with the bulk of this coming from wastewater discharge.  
Despite the fact that in the aggregate, spill volume from drilling is a small percentage of 
total volume spilled, large spills of the size and location of the Deepwater Horizon incident can 
have a significant impact on ecosystems and the economy. For a significant spill in the deep 
water of the Gulf, much of the effects, particularly long-term effects, are unknown. Nonetheless, 
we can roughly identify categories of damages that are likely to carry the largest social damages. 
Based on previous experience with large spills, the largest single category is likely to be nonuse 
values for avoiding the ecological effects of spills, such as habitat damage and dead seabirds. 
The next-largest category is likely to be the avoidance of economic damages in markets affected 
by the spill; for example, lost revenues across the commercial fishing, hospitality, and recreation 
industries.  
Next, we categorize each type of damage arising from a spill as being either private (e.g. 
the value of lost oil) or an “externality”—damage to third parties or the public (e.g. natural 
resource damages). We then examine which of these externalities under existing laws are 
internalized by responsible parties. To the extent that future drillers take into account (i.e., 
internalize) the possible future damages into their drilling decisions, then additional regulatory 
policies are not necessary. In the case of catastrophic spills, despite the large payments made to 
injured parties, it appears that significant externalities may not be internalized by our current 
laws and regulations. Government responses to the Deepwater Horizon spill may ultimately 
result in greater internalization.  
The paper concludes by providing a framework for analyzing the costs and benefits of a 
ban or further regulation of deepwater drilling. Although we have attempted to place dollar 
values on both the benefits and the costs, we caution the reader that these figures are meant to be 
illustrative and are based on a simplistic empirical analysis. Three potential regulatory cases are 
considered in this analysis: 1) a permanent ban on drilling applicable to all deepwater and 
ultradeepwater areas; 2) a “high-cost intermediate regulation” that supposes that raising U.S. 
safety standards increases the costs of exploration, development, and production by 20 percent; 
and a “low-cost intermediate regulation,” where production costs rise by 10 percent. In 2035, the 
permanent ban, under which only shallow-water drilling is permissible, reduces U.S. offshore 
production by 79 percent, from 2.4 million barrels per day (“mmbd”) to just 0.5 mmbd. The 
intermediate regulation has a much more moderate effect, reducing offshore production by 4 
percent (low-cost case) or 8 percent (high-cost case). The impacts on the world oil price are 
moderate to negligible. Resources for the Future  Krupnick et al. 
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The annual costs of a ban are $64 billion in welfare costs, plus $1 billion per year in 
losses to energy security ($65 billion). Assuming a ban would prevent a catastrophic spill from 
occurring once every 10 years and scaling up benefits estimates from research performed after 
the Exxon Valdez spill, the welfare benefits are $16.1 billion to $29.5 billion annually—
considerably less than the annual costs of the ban. Given our assumptions, only if the ban 
prevented one catastrophic spill every four years or less would a ban on deepwater drilling be 
justified on a social cost–benefit basis. 
In contrast to a ban, a regulation raising extraction costs by 20 percent would result in, at 
most, $22 billion in annual costs. Assuming that the regulation eliminates a catastrophic spill 
once every 10 years, it would pass a cost–benefit test only with the higher end of the benefits 
estimates—with costs of $22 billion annually and benefits up to $29.5 billion. Where costs rise 
only 10 percent, welfare costs are about $11 billion annually. Thus, even at the low estimate of 
welfare benefits ($16.1 billion annually), the regulation would pass a cost–benefit test.  
In summary, this paper demonstrates a comprehensive framework to assess the costs and 
benefits of a ban or further regulation of deepwater oil drilling that also captures any negative 
benefits associated with substituting away from deepwater drilling toward other fuels, imported 
oil or oil from shallow water or land-based wells. Such a framework, if applied in a deliberate 
and comprehensive way that was beyond the scope of our paper, could help government agencies 
charged with regulating deepwater drilling produce more credible and comprehensive Regulatory 
Impact Analyses and, ultimately, better designed (e.g., more efficient) regulations. 
Introduction 
The recent accident at the BP Deepwater Horizon site was the largest accidental marine 
oil spill in world history, leaking, according to the U.S. scientific teams1 appointed by Admiral 
Thad Allen, an estimated 205.8 million gallons2 (4.9 million barrels) of oil into the Gulf of 
Mexico (DOI 2010a). That amount exceeds the annual average from 1990 to 1999 of oil spills 
and releases from both natural and anthropogenic sources, 197.4 million gallons annually (4.7 
million barrels). The Deepwater Horizon spill was about 42 percent larger than that of the Ixtoc 
                                                 
1 The U.S. Scientific team is comprised of the National Incident Command’s Flow Rate Technical Group (FRTG), 
led by United States Geological Survey (USGS) Director Marcia McNutt, and a team of Department of Energy 
(DOE) scientists and engineers, led by Energy Secretary Steven Chu (DOI 2010a). 
2 However, this estimate has been recently challenged by BP. The Oil Spill Commission and the Associated Press 
received a 10 page document from BP on December 3, 2010 claiming that the estimates produced by the U.S. 
Scientific Team are overstated by 20 to 50 percent (Cappiello 2010). Resources for the Future  Krupnick et al. 
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I, the next-largest offshore drilling spill off the U.S. coast, and about 19 times the size of the 
Exxon Valdez, the largest tanker spill off the U.S. coast. 
Following the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster, the Obama administration announced a 
six-month moratorium on deepwater oil and gas drilling and the shutdown of deepwater 
exploratory wells already operating in U.S. waters until new safety requirements had been met. 
This moratorium has since been lifted, but in a new action, the administration has placed the 
Eastern Gulf of Mexico and the Mid and South Atlantic off limits for deepwater drilling for at 
least the next seven years (DOI 2010b). In the rest of the Western and Central Gulf, companies 
will be required to meet new regulatory safety standards before they are allowed to continue their 
operations, and lease sales in these areas are scheduled to begin in 12 months (DOI 2010b). 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a conceptual framework for understanding how 
costs and benefits might be incorporated into an assessment of regulatory policies affecting 
deepwater drilling. We begin, in Section 1, with detailed definitions of the economic concepts 
used throughout this paper. We also provide a framework for analyzing the life-cycle impacts of 
oil drilling and its alternatives.  
Section 2 provides background estimates of the different sources of oil supplied in the 
United States, looks at how other oil supply sources might respond to regulations on deepwater 
drilling, and considers the economic costs of these regulations. Section 3 provides a 
comprehensive taxonomy of the potential costs and benefits from deepwater drilling as well as 
alternative sources of oil. When possible, we provide estimates of the magnitude of these 
benefits and costs. Section 4 discusses to the extent to which these costs and benefits may 
already be taken into account (or reinforced) through the legal, regulatory, and tax systems and 
through market mechanisms. Section 5 presents a framework and simple example of how a cost–
benefit analysis might be used to inform regulation of deepwater drilling. The final section sums 
up the implications for policy. 
1. Theoretical Framework  
This section presents underlying concepts and definitions for classifying and discussing 
the costs and benefits of policies directed to offshore drilling. First, we define the terms used 
throughout the rest of the paper (Box 1). We start with welfare economics, which is a coherent 
body of theory and applications that guides decisionmakers in measuring the effect of a given 
regulatory policy or other activity on society—through its effects on consumers, producers, and 
the government. Effects on consumers are measured by changes in consumer surplus (the 
difference between what households would be willing to pay for a product, reflecting their 
consumption benefits, and what they actually pay), effects on producers by changes in producer Resources for the Future  Krupnick et al. 
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surplus (the revenue raised from selling a product less the costs of producing the product—
basically, profits), and effects on government from changes in tax revenues (e.g., due to the loss 
of fuel tax revenue). Many of these effects are experienced through markets, but others, such as 
forgone damages to the environment or human health, are experienced outside markets. These 
are measured by society’s willingness to pay to avoid such damages; several techniques exist for 
obtaining such estimates.  
Cost–benefit analysis is a technique for accounting for all the positive and negative 
effects of a regulation in terms of their claim on our scarce resources. Such analyses are required 
by governments around the world to help determine whether society would be better off with a 
regulation than without it, or which design for a regulation would result in greater net benefits to 
society. These analyses divide effects into costs, or what we term regulatory costs, and benefits 
of the regulation.  
In this paper, regulatory costs include direct costs imposed by a regulation on deepwater 
drilling as well as other costs of the regulation as captured by changes in markets. For instance, if 
regulation raises the costs of deepwater drilling, the price of oil may rise. Other things equal, this 
reduces consumer surplus through higher prices for oil products like transportation and heating 
fuels. It may also change industry profits. Section 2 and Appendix A cover these issues in more 
detail.  
We follow conventional terminology in capturing effects of pollution on ecology, human 
health, and markets (see ORNL-RFF 1996 as an example), starting with the term burden. A 
burden is any release or spill of oil wherever it occurs, in any of the stages of economic activity 
(such as extraction, ocean transport, pipelines, tanker trucks, refining, and end use by 
consumers). Burdens enter the natural environment, where they interact with living things 
(plants, animals, humans) and other nonliving features of the environment that sustain life (such 
as sediments). The results of these interactions (such as fish mortality and petroleum 
concentrations in fish) are called impacts. These impacts then have effects on the economic 
system (such as reductions in the fish catch and lower profits in commercial fishing). Negative 
economic effects are termed damages; positive ones are termed benefits or avoided damages.  
Note that these terms apply not only to avoided releases or spills but also to impacts 
caused by broader effects on supply and demand as regulations raise the cost of deepwater 
drilling: in particular, imported oil from overseas and land-based oil drilling may expand while 
overall oil consumption may fall. For example, if oil imports increase, there may be additional 
tanker spills or exacerbated effects on energy security. If land-based drilling increases, there may 











in driving cuts air pollution and relieves congestion, with human health and time-saving benefits, 
respectively.  
Another term to consider is externalities. These are effects on third parties that are not a 
part of a market transaction. To the extent that oil spills and releases from deepwater drilling 
harm marine ecosystems or coastal tourism, for example, they result in damages that are not 
borne (or not immediately borne) by the firm responsible for the spill. These are externalities. It 
is important to consider whether externalities are internalized into the behavior of those causing 
them, in which case the responsible parties take due care in their future decisions. If such 
externalities are already internalized prior to a proposed policy, then they do not count separately 
in the cost–benefit analysis conducted to assess the new policy.  
How do externalities become internalized into a company’s behavior? One way is 
through actions in markets. Fatal and nonfatal injury risk to rig workers (e.g., from fires or 
explosions) are generally viewed as internalized because jobs with relatively high accident risks 
tend to be compensated through higher wages and health and insurance benefits. The tort liability 
system is another way to induce due care. A third way is indirectly through taxes on their 
activities. A fourth way might be through changes in a company’s stock prices when a disaster 
occurs. If a company’s behavior with respect to risky activities fully takes into account the 
market, regulatory, legal, and financial environment in which it operates, as well as the 
probability and consequences of accidents, then one could argue that it has internalized the 
externalities. In practice, however, such judgments are extremely difficult to make.  
 
Box 1. Definitions of Terms Resources for the Future  Krupnick et al. 
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In addition to their use in the cost–benefit calculus, uninternalized externalities are 
important because their existence implies that market behavior is inefficient, which potentially 
creates a role for government intervention to correct the inefficiency. For example, if firms do 
not bear the full societal risks associated with oil spills, they may underinvest (from society’s 
perspective) in measures to prevent spills.  
Figure 1 provides a schematic of the cost–benefit analysis components. A regulation on 
deepwater drilling imposes regulatory costs directly on this activity but might also increase oil 
supplied from other sources. For example, if the supply of oil from deepwater drilling is reduced 
as a result of regulation or moratoria, there may be a partially offsetting increase in supply from 
shallow-water drilling (e.g., in Alaskan waters), land drilling, pipeline imports (from Canada), or 
tanker imports from other countries. Each source of oil might have different transportation, 
refining, and distribution implications—each carrying its own risk of impacts—whether through 
oil spills, air or water pollution, or human accidents and fatalities. These impacts may lead to 
damages (the value of those impacts). Thus, any increase in damages from these other supply 
sources must be weighed against the benefits from reducing deepwater drilling. One particular 
concern is the negative national security and foreign policy implications of increased dependence 
on foreign oil as a result of reduced domestic production. Figure 1 also indicates that some of 
these damages are ultimately internalized by firms that cause harm, while others are not 
internalized and count in a cost–benefit analysis. Overall, after netting out all the benefits and 
costs associated with regulation, one has an estimate of the net welfare effects on society, a 
measure of how society’s utility, or satisfaction, has changed as the result of a regulation.  
2. Impact of Drilling Regulations on Sources of Oil Supply 
Here we briefly present a picture of expected oil supply trends, prior to the recent oil 
drilling ban. Drawing from Brown (2010), we then indicate the potential effects of new 
regulations on deepwater drilling. Based on calculations presented in Appendix A, we estimate 
the economic welfare cost of these policies, prior to accounting for any externalities.  
Supply Trends Prior to the Deepwater Drilling Ban 
As shown in Figure 2, U.S. offshore oil production currently amounts to about 1.7 million 
barrels per day (mmbd), or 8.7 percent of total U.S. supply.  
Prior to the drilling ban, U.S. offshore oil production was projected to rise steadily to 2.4 
mmbd by 2035, or 10.7 percent of the country’s total supply, with most of the growth from 
deepwater (water depth between 1,000 and 4,999 feet) or ultradeepwater (water depth greater 
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Potential Impacts of Drilling Restrictions 
According to EIA (2010b), the recently imposed six-month ban on deepwater and 
ultradeepwater drilling will reduce domestic crude oil production by about 0.07 mmbd (about 
0.36 percent of domestic oil consumption) in the first part of 2011. Brown (2010) considers two 
possibilities for a permanent tightening of deepwater drilling regulations and compares them 
with a business-as-usual case when oil supply trends revert to those in Figure 2 after the drilling 
ban is lifted. One bounding case looks at a permanent ban applicable to all deepwater and 
ultradeepwater areas. The other, which we call “high-cost intermediate regulation,” supposes that 
raising safety standards to those set in other countries, like Brazil, Canada, and the United 
Kingdom, increases the costs of exploration, development, and production by 20 percent. 
However, Brown (2010) also notes that industry sources suggest the costs of these safety 
standards could be lower. We therefore also consider a “low-cost intermediate regulation,” where 
production costs rise by 10 percent (i.e., price and quantity impacts are half as large as those in 
the high-cost case). We caution, however, that neither the 10 percent nor the 20 percent cost 
increase estimates are grounded in solid research. We use these figures for illustration and 










1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
Source: Energy Information Administration (2010a)
GTL and CTL  Biofuels  Offshore L48  Natural Gas Plant Liquids Alaska Onshore L48 Net Imports Other Domestic Supply
History Projected
Figure 2. US Petroleum Supply by Source, 1990‐2035Resources for the Future  Krupnick et al. 
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Table 1 summarizes the results for 2035, based on simulating a model of the U.S. oil 
market, benchmarked to the trends in Figure 2. The permanent ban, under which only shallow-
water drilling is permissible, reduces U.S. offshore production by 79 percent, from 2.4 mmbd to 
just 0.5 mmbd. The intermediate regulation has a much more moderate effect, reducing offshore 
production by 4 percent (low-cost case) or 8 percent (high-cost case). 
The impacts on the world oil price are moderate to negligible. The complete drilling ban 
raises the projected world oil price in 2035 about $4.10 per barrel, from $133.20 per barrel to 
$137.30 per barrel (3 percent), while the intermediate regulation raises the price by just $0.10 to 
$0.30 per barrel. These findings reflect the impact on world oil production— which falls by 1.5 
percent and about 0.1 percent under the policies, respectively—and an assumption that 
withdrawing 1 percent of oil production from the market leads to a 2 percent increase in price 
over the longer haul.  
About 23 percent of the reduction in offshore oil production under either policy is 
reflected in a reduction in domestic consumption. About 68 percent of the reduction is replaced 
by increased oil imports, while 5 to 8 percent of it is replaced by increased on-shore production. 
 
Regulatory Cost of Policies—Initial Assessment Ignoring Externalities 
In Appendix A, we provide approximate calculations of the net regulatory costs of the 
regulatory scenarios, for 2035, using the price and production figures above. Our cost estimates 
Baseline
low‐cost high‐cost
World oil price, 2008 $ per barrel 133.2 133.4 133.5 137.3
Production and consumption effects, mmbd
World oil production  110.6 110.5 110.5 109.0
US consumption 22.00 22.0 21.97 21.59
US onshore production 7.42 7.43 7.43 7.52
US offshore production 2.36 2.30 2.23 0.50
US biofuels 2.56 2.56 2.56 2.65
Total US production 12.3 12.3 12.2 10.7
US net imports 9.66 9.71 9.75 10.9
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are based on “economic welfare,” which measures the benefits to oil consumers from offshore 
oil production, less the costs to firms of supplying this crude oil.  
For the intermediate regulation, the regulatory cost amounts to a maximum of $11.4 
billion in the low-cost case and a maximum of $22.1 billion a year in 2035 (in 2008 dollars). 
There would be no cost to this regulation if firms had adopted safety technologies anyway, in the 
absence of regulation, perhaps as they revised upward their perceptions of spillage risks from 
existing technology in the wake of the BP Deepwater spill. At the other extreme, if they made no 
safety upgrades, costs would mainly reflect the (assumed) 10 or 20 percent increase in 
production costs due to meeting the regulation. For the years between now and 2035, the 
annualized costs of regulation would be smaller, but only moderately so, given that the level of 
offshore oil production in the business-as-usual case is not that different in the intervening years, 
compared with 2035 (Figure 1). 
As discussed in Appendix A, the regulatory costs of the complete offshore drilling ban 
are more speculative because we lack accurate information on the production costs that would be 
saved by shutting down all deepwater production. In Table 1, we report a lower-bound estimate 
of $64.4 billion a year for 2035; this may substantially understate the true regulatory cost 
(Appendix A). Again, our lower-bound estimate for the intervening years to 2035 would not be 
that different. 
3. Assessing Damages from Deepwater Drilling and Its Alternatives  
This section provides a comprehensive framework for assessing damages from deepwater 
oil drilling as well as alternatives (such as onshore drilling and importing oil from abroad). As 
described earlier, we distinguish between environmental burdens (oil spilled), impacts (harm 
caused by the oil), and damages (monetized value of impacts). This approach highlights the fact 
that the ultimate effect of oil spills depends on numerous factors—including the type and quality 
of oil, location of the spill, and current weather patterns. Our analysis follows a 1996 study on 
the social costs of generating electricity by burning oil (ORNL-RFF 1996) and a more recent 
report by the National Research Council (NRC 2010), which considered the social costs of 
energy, focusing primarily on air pollutants. Unlike alternative damage assessment approaches, 
this taxonomy can help detect which production activities, or “sources,” cause the greatest 
damage. For example, slow and chronic releases from human consumption of oil account for a 
large portion of oil-related pollution, yet these are easily absorbed by local ecosystems with little 
environmental damage. The taxonomy also serves as a checklist to help evaluate who ultimately 
bears the costs of oil pollution damages. Finally, it highlights the trade-offs inherent in any 
public policy decision. For example, a ban on deepwater drilling may increase demand for land Resources for the Future  Krupnick et al. 
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and shallow-water production. Although a ban on deepwater drilling may decrease oil spilled in 
the Gulf of Mexico, offsetting onshore drilling might affect the surface water quality, and 
ultimately groundwater, as well as marine life in surrounding areas.  
The remainder of this section starts by listing the burdens, followed by the impacts, and 
finally damages. We also provide an assessment of the likely magnitude of damages from a 
catastrophic spill, with a relative ranking of damage categories. Finally, we discuss additional 
damages that may arise from deepwater oil drilling—or a ban on drilling—including damages 
caused by substitute methods of extraction, and the impacts of a reduction in oil consumption 
following any rise in the price of oil related to a ban on, or further regulation of, deepwater 
drilling. 
















































Burdens Assessment  
Although we are primarily concerned with damages from deepwater drilling, 62 percent 
of all oil found in waters off the North American coast (within the 200-mile economic exclusion 
zone, EEZ) is attributable to slow yet chronic releases from natural seeps in the seabed.  
To account for the remaining 38 percent of oil resulting from anthropogenic activity, we 
divide these activities into extraction (3 percent), transportation (10 percent), and consumption 
(87 percent), as shown in Figure 3 below. Extraction covers platform spills (such as the BP 
Deepwater Horizon spill), wastewater discharge, and atmospheric volatilization (resulting in 
volatile organic compounds in the air). Extraction is divided into deepwater and shallow water. 
Extraction activities in North American waters account for only 3 percent of anthropogenic oil 
spills to ocean waters (or 1.2 percent of all spills), with the bulk of this coming from wastewater 
discharge (NRC 2003).  
Although episodic spills, such as those from large tankers or, most recently, from 
infrastructure breakdowns, draw public attention and scrutiny, it should be noted that oil spills 
from tankers account for approximately 8 percent of oil spills and other releases worldwide but 
only 2 percent in North America (NRC 2003). Transportation activities include tanker and 
pipeline spills, coastal facility spills, cargo washings, and atmospheric volatilization. Pipeline 
spills and leaks account for 2 percent of all anthropogenic oil releases to North American coastal 


















es for the Fu
age size of la








ur 2010).  
Oil releases d












er Port Act (
973), Outer 
zardous Subs





er loads and 




























































cent of all oi
ce is runoff in





ne spills is 0.





78), and the 

















t of Resources for the Future  Krupnick et al. 
15 
Note that those data omit two major sources of oil spills: those from tankers beyond the 
200-mile EEZ and those from land-based extraction activities. Nevertheless, we include land-
based extraction as a category of oil spill because it might be affected by legislative or regulatory 
action directed at deepwater drilling. 
Assessing Impacts 
As discussed earlier, some oil releases (burdens) have little impact on ecological 
resources or human activity, but others might have a very significant and long-lasting impact. 
For example, 62 percent of the burden of oil releases is from natural seepage, but to the degree 
that they are understood, the impacts are thought to be relatively harmless. Most marine 
organisms exposed to oil from natural seeps have adapted to these releases over time and can 
metabolize the substance. For this reason, the oil released from natural seeps is not thought to 
pose an imminent threat to the natural ecosystems in the ocean (NRC 2003). 
Table 2 summarizes the sources of oil spillage, release, and ultimate deposition into the 
ocean during extraction, transportation, and consumption and identifies all the potential impacts 
from each source. We classify impacts into effects on natural resources and effects on humans 
directly. Concerning natural resources, we recognize that because of our emphasis on monetary 
damages and externalities, the impact categories need to map as cleanly as possible into our 
categories of damages. Boyd and Krupnick (2009) argue that to avoid double-counting of 
damages, one should capture effects only on “top-level” or other species (such as shrimp, clams, 
and mussels) of value to humans, avoiding categories that include habitat supporting such 
species, or species and vegetation that support species of value. We take a more expansive view 
here to capture the many dimensions of impacts from oil spills.  
The effects on flora and fauna can be of several types. Fish, plant life, and invertebrates 
can be killed on contact, their reproductive success can be impaired (both of which we classify as 
mortality resulting in lower populations), they can be deformed,3 or their flesh or other body 
parts can become contaminated, leading not only to human health effects directly but also to 
bioaccumulation up the food chain. The classification also recognizes that mobile ocean species 
can avoid oil in the water. Such avoidance may disrupt economic activities as diverse as 
commercial fishing and bird-watching. We also recognize that, based on economic valuation 
                                                 
3 We categorize such effects under contamination, since sea life needs to be contaminated to experience morbidity 
effects. Resources for the Future  Krupnick et al. 
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studies, people place additional and separate values on marine birds and mammals that, through 
direct oil contact, can be killed or have their reproductive success reduced by oil contamination.  
As for habitat impacts, we list five classes: effects on the water surface, effects on habitat 
below the surface in the water column or sediments, and effects on beaches and other land 
bordering the water body, plus effects on groundwater (which would be virtually zero for an 
ocean spill, but not for a spill on land) and on air quality (through volatilization).  
Human health impacts are divided into mortality and morbidity. Injury, illness, or death 
can affect workers on rigs, those engaged in cleanup activities, and civilians through increased 
cancer risks from eating contaminated food or breathing contaminated air.4 We capture 
additional impacts that affect economic activity, such as tarballs that drive tourists away from 
beaches, in the link between changes in beach quality and damages through recreation losses 
(discussed below). 
In Table 2, impacts are classified as low (L), medium (M), high (H), or insufficient 
knowledge (I). A dash indicates little or no impact. For example, because the complex 
ecosystems in the deep sea are currently not well understood, the impact of oil pollution in deep 
water is currently unknown. These qualitative assessments of the magnitude of impact caused by 
oil production were determined largely by existing scientific research and historical precedent, 
specifically the findings of marine toxicologists who have worked on prior spills5 and our own 
judgment based on reading the literature.  
Our qualitative impact ratings are not based on aggregate national impacts and are not 
necessarily meant to represent a priority ranking of areas of concern. Instead, they represent an 
assessment of the magnitude of potential impacts for an oil spill or release of a given size. For 
example, unlike the slow and chronic releases from the seabed, which are unlikely to have a 
significant impact on marine ecosystems, an equivalent amount of oil spilled during an episodic 
blowout or a tanker accident can have immediate impacts on ecosystems and marine life. In such 
an event, we would also anticipate delayed impacts, such as degradation of air quality due to 
atmospheric volatilization of oil slicks and contamination of groundwater due to oil-ridden 
surface water.  
                                                 
4 There have already been increases in reports of nausea, dizziness, and headaches by Gulf residents and workers. 
Polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) are proven carcinogens and neurotoxins, so the public health impacts of 
exposure to these pollutants could be severe albeit not immediately apparent. If not removed, PAHs persist much 
longer in sand and sediment than in water and could create a long-term environmental and health hazard along the 
Gulf coast. 
5 See, for example, Yardley (2010), Loureiro et al. (2006), Ramseur (2010), NRC (2003), and NOAA (2010). Resources for the Future  Krupnick et al. 
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The types of impacts and the magnitude of each depend on a variety of factors. For 
example, spills in cold water, like the Exxon Valdez tanker spill off the Alaska coast, generally 
have a relatively slower evaporation and dissolution rate. By contrast, spills that reach the 
surface of warm water dissolve and volatilize much more rapidly (NRC 2003). Spills from 
deepwater rigs or pipelines that are far below the ocean’s surface undergo a weathering process, 
the duration of which is inversely correlated with the pressure levels and the velocity at which 
the oil escapes. The weathering process decomposes oil into microscopic droplets that then 
disperse and naturally degrade. In fact, an estimated 16 percent of the oil spilled by Deepwater 
Horizon has been removed through natural degradation (NOAA 2010).  
Despite the volume of oil of the Deepwater Horizon incident, the impacts are much 
different from what they would have been had the spill occurred in shallow water, where the 
ecosystem is much more sensitive and the marine life is more concentrated and characterized by 
greater biodiversity (NRC 2003). Nevertheless, recent scientific studies have shown that some of 
the oil has blanketed the sea floor, where it has killed shrimp and other macroinvertebrates. The 
long-run impacts this will have on the ecosystem are unknown.Resources for the Future  Krupnick et al. 
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Table 2. Impacts from Oil Spillage or Releases: high (H), medium (M), low (L), insufficient knowledge (I), trace (—), not applicable (na)  








































Natural seeps   I I  —  I  —  I  —  —  —  —  —  —  62.5 
Extraction 
(water)                        3.1  1.2 
Platform spills
7                       0.2  0.1 
Wastewater 
discharge
8                       2.8  1.1 
Atmospheric 
volatilization                       0.1  — 
Extraction 
(deepwater)  I I  L  I  I  I  M  —  M  L  M    
Platform spills  I  I  I  I  I  I  M  —  —  L  M     
Wastewater 
discharge  I I  I I  I  I  M  —  —  —  —    
Atmospheric 





M H  M H  H  M  H  —  H  L  L     
                                                 
6 Annual average estimates, 1990–1999. 
7 Includes accidental spills of crude oil, very rare occurrences of blowouts, as well as minor spills of refined products from equipment and vessels associated with platform 
operations. 
8 Residual water from reservoir pumped to the surface in oil production; although current industry practice is to treat “produced water” before discharging it, trace levels 
remain. The volume of produced water relative to production increases as oil reserves age. In general, shallow-water extraction sites are older than deepwater sites. It follows 
that the proportion of deepwater discharge to production is smaller relative to the ratio of shallow-water discharge to production. 
9 Studies of the harmful effects to coastal marine habitats of wastewater discharge from inshore facilities led to legislation in late 1990s prohibiting land facilities from 
discharging produced water into coastal waters. Resources for the Future  Krupnick et al. 
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10 M  H  M  H  H  H  H  M  H  L  L     
Wastewater 
discharge  M H  M H  H H  H  —  —  —  —     
Atmospheric 
volatilization  — —  L —  —  —  —  —  H  —  —     
Extraction 
(land) 
— —  — —  —  —  —  H  H  L  L  na  na 
Platform spills  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  H  —  L  L  na  na 
Wastewater 
discharge  I I  —  — —  —  —  H  —  —  —  na  na 
Atmospheric 
volatilization  — —  — —  —  —  —  —  H  —  — na  na 
Transportation  H H  H H  H  H  H  M  —  L  L 9.5 3.6 
Pipeline spills  H  H  H  H  H
11 H  H
12 M —  L  L  2.0  0.8 
Tanker spills
13 H  H  H  H  H  H  H — —  L L  5.5 2.0 
Atmospheric 
volatilization  — —  — —  —  —  —  —  —  —  — —  — 




15  H H  H H  H  H  H  —  —  —  —  2.0  0.8 
                                                 
10 Platform spills into state waters account for 61 percent, whereas spills in the Outer Continental Shelf account for 39 percent of all platform spills; platform spills in the Gulf 
of Mexico account for 92 percent of total platform spills in North America. 
11 Most common in coastal waters, since the pipeline infrastructure is older (approaching 50 years old in many places) and more susceptible to accidents. 
12 Impacts depend on how far from surface the pipeline spill occurs. Pipeline spills occurring at low elevations undergo a longer weathering process, resulting in a more 
dispersed, less dense oil slick. Those occurring in shallow waters or closer to the surface result in oil slicks that are much denser, thicker, and less dispersed. 
13 Impacts vary depending on the location of spill with respect to the coast. Coastal spills such as the Prestige had very detrimental effects to coastal activity and ecosystems. 
Impacts also vary according to the size of the spill.  
14 Cargo washings are illegal in North America. Illegal discharges are reported as tanker spills.  Resources for the Future  Krupnick et al. 
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— L  L M  L  M
17 M  —  — —  —  56.2  21.1 
Recreational 
marine boating  — L  L M  L M  M  —  —  —  — 5.8  2.2 
Nontank 
vessels
18  L L  —  L  —  L  L  —  —  —  —  1.2  0.5 
Atmospheric 





— —  L  L  L  M
20 L  —  — —  —  1.6  0.6 
TOTAL
21                       100.0 100.0 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
15 Coastal location makes facility spills detrimental to the coastal environment, yielding significant impacts from both episodic and chronic releases.  
16 Urban runoff is a function of coastal population growth, increasing with the number of cars, asphalt highways and parking lots, municipal wastewater loads, and improper 
use and disposal of petroleum products. This estimate also captures petroleum refinery wastewater, municipal wastewaters, and nonrefining industrial wastes. Estimates have 
very high degree of uncertainty because the inputs as well as fates are not well understood.  
17 Urban runoff and recreational marine boating discharges are problematic in that they are chronic and often occur in sensitive coastal ecosystems. 
18 Spills from nontanker vessels are rare; however, operational discharges are large and include machinery space bilge oil, fuel sludges, and oily ballast. MARPOL 73/78 
regulations have significantly reduced and in some cases eliminated discharge of oily and other pollutants into the sea.  
19 Reporting of releases is required but not at all monitored; jettisoning occurs mostly over lakes and coastal waters. 
20 Jet fuel is a light distillate, which has water-soluble fraction containing 2- and 3-ringed PAHs, which may affect marine life because they are highly bioavailable to seafood 
tissues, particularly fatty fish and shellfish, and particularly in relatively cold water. Light distillates are not adhesive, so they have minimal effect on shoreline habitats and 
beaches. 





























Box 3. Issues in Estimating Damages from BP Deepwater Horizon Event 
 
From Impacts to Damages 
Table 3 links the impacts from Table 2 to various economic damage categories. Market-
based damages (those that are experienced directly through market transactions) include losses to 
agriculture, aquaculture, commercial fishing, port and transportation services, private property, 
the hospitality industry (hotels, restaurants, and tourism) and related industries, and employee 
health. Nonmarket damages are classified as public health, public recreation, and nonuse values 
(i.e., the willingness of households to pay to avoid environmental damage even though they may 
never use the environmental amenity themselves). Public health damages in the form of mortality 
and morbidity can be experienced via three routes: (1) breathing the volatilized organic Resources for the Future  Krupnick et al. 
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compounds (such as PAHs) from the oil; (2) coming into contact with oil, say at a beach, if this 
contact is not part of one’s job; and (3) eating tainted seafood. Many estimates of the value to 
individuals of avoiding increased mortality risks, increased cancer risks, and increased injury or 
less severe morbidity risks exist in the economics literature and are used routinely in regulatory 
impact analyses by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and other agencies. See Box 4 for 
details on approaches to estimating damages. 
 






















































Nonuse values are the willingness of individuals to pay for avoiding damages to an 
ecosystem, apart from their use (if any) of that system. For example, the public may care about 
reduced fish populations, dead birds, and lost habitat beyond their pure economic value. Nonuse 
values, unlike those in the first two nonmarket categories, are not localized. In theory, anyone in 
the United States, indeed anyone in the world, could have such values for avoiding impacts in the 
Gulf. Thus, even if average nonuse values per person are only a few dollars, this category of 
damages can be a very large component of total damages. 
Public recreation damage is any loss of utility associated with forgone recreation 
activities (such as swimming, boating, and beachcombing) or having to travel to recreation areas 
that are less desirable to the individual. There is a long history of studies that estimate how 
recreation activities in a population are affected by pollution, closures, fishing bans, or creation 
of new recreational areas, and from that information, how much people would be willing to pay 
to experience their preferred recreational activities. Resources for the Future  Krupnick et al. 
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Table 3. Economic Damages from Natural Resource and Human Health Impacts Resulting from Oil Spills and Releases  
Natural resource 
































Fish and invertebrate 
displacement     X  X      X  X         
Fish and invertebrate 
mortality/reproductive 
damage 
 X  X  X     X  X      X   
Seabird and marine 
mammal mortality      X        X
26     X  




 X  X  X     X  X    X    X 
Shoreline 
contamination   X   X  X  X  X        X   
Habitat loss or 
alteration
28   X  X  X             X  X
 
Air quality                  X  X  X   
Surface water quality  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X    X  X  X 
Groundwater quality  X          X        X  X   
Human mortality                  X       
Human morbidity                  X  X
29    
                                                 
22 Includes all paid water recreation, such as boating, fishing, scuba diving, and jet skiing.  
23 Includes restaurants, hotels, and other business that cater specifically, although not exclusively, to visitors.  
24 For example, canning and food-processing industries often slow or shut down operations because of lower inputs due to fishing losses. 
25 Includes all unpaid recreation, such as public beach use, swimming, and surfing.  
26 The fur seal pelt industry, for example, suffers losses as a result of any contamination or death of fur seals.  
27 Includes detectable contamination as well as more subtle contamination caused by pollution of sea sediments and biota that can result in bioaccumulation, the buildup of a 
chemical substance in an organism to levels that are higher than in the environment where the organism lives; PAHs are the compounds most likely to bioaccumulate in 
marine organisms, the degree to which varies by species and water temperature.  
28 Includes damages to such human activities as scuba diving. 
29 Volunteer cleanup crews may be exposed to carcinogenic compounds through direct contact or through the air. A study conducted on Prestige spill cleanup workers 
showed that two sets of volunteers working in March 2003 and April 2003, respectively, showed similar concentrations of volatile substances as the average for individuals 



















In Table 3, the cells designated with an X indicate which impacts map into which types 
of damages. More granular qualitative judgments are not possible, since the units of impacts 
(e.g., habitat losses and human injuries and deaths) differ dramatically across the categories. In 
some cases, one impact affects several economic endpoints, while others are more limited. 
Furthermore, some impacts are delayed. For example, the economic damages due to the loss of 
the herring industry in Prince William Sound were not fully realized until nearly a decade after 
the Exxon Valdez spill. The herring fisheries have gradually disappeared, at a cost of about $400 
million (in discounted forgone profits) throughout the affected region (Yardley 2010). 
 
Box 5. Impacts of Onshore Drilling 
Note that cleanup costs were not included in the taxonomy in Table 2 because these are 
ex post actions typically mandated by the government. They are not direct damages from the 
spill; instead, they are designed to mitigate some of the damages a spill might otherwise cause. In 
some cases, however, cleanup measures can exacerbate the damages caused by the spill itself. 
One common cleanup response is the release of chemicals into deep waters to accelerate the 
degradation process before the oil reaches the surface. This was done in response to Deepwater 
Horizon: 770,000 gallons of chemical dispersants were released at the Macondo wellhead, about 
one mile below the surface. Although this practice is hotly debated, since it may deplete oxygen 
levels and create “dead zones” in the ocean, the effort may significantly reduce impacts farther Resources for the Future  Krupnick et al. 
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from the site. For example, a reported 8 percent of the original spill volume was chemically 
dispersed (NOAA 2010; Borenstein 2010).  
Size of Damages from Deepwater Spills 
Damages from a deepwater spill depend on factors such as distance to shoreline and 
water surface, water temperature, climate, spill volume, as well as the type and numbers of living 
things, property, and economic activity at risk. Because there have been very few large spills the 
size of the Exxon Valdez or the Deepwater Horizon, it is difficult to draw conclusions about the 
likely size of damages from analyzing past spills. However, a starting point is to look at the 
distribution of damages from earlier spills. 
For a significant spill in the deep water of the Gulf, much of the effects, particularly long-
term effects, are unknown. Nonetheless, we can roughly identify categories of damages that are 
likely to carry the largest and smallest social damages. Based on previous experience with large 
spills, the largest single category is likely to be nonuse values, where reports of habitat damage, 
dead seabirds, tarballs on beaches, beach closures and commercial fishing area closures would 
lead to widespread public support for avoiding another such ecological and economic 
catastrophe. As noted above, because these concerns touch so many people, the collective 
willingness to pay to prevent future spills can be very large.30 
The next-largest categories are likely to be economic damages in markets affected by the 
spill. Table 4 provides data on total revenues from commercial fishing and from the coastal 
tourism and recreation industry for states affected by the Deepwater Horizon event (or that 
would be affected by any event in the Gulf). Tourism and recreation are far larger contributors to 
regional gross domestic product (GDP) than commercial fishing ($34 billion versus $700 
million). Louisiana dominates fishing activities, whereas the west coast of Florida has by far the 
largest revenues at risk from tourism and recreation. To give some specificity, if 1 percent of 
commercial fishing were harmed, lost revenues would be $6 million, although likely distributed 
among a low-income population. One percent damage to tourism and recreation results in $340 
million in lost revenues across the hospitality and recreation industries. Although these lost 
                                                 
30 We note that Helton and Penn (1999), discussed further below, indicate that natural resource damages constitute 
only about 26 percent of total damages for the spills they analyzed, with the largest category being response costs—
about 50 percent of the total. However, Helton and Penn (1999) do not estimate actual natural resource damages, 
only the portion actually paid by the responsible parties. In addition, our analysis is concerned with the externalities 
of a spill—and most of the response costs are internalized to responsible parties. Thus, our analysis serves a 
different purpose from Helton and Penn (1999), who attempt to assess the out-of-pocket costs to responsible parties. Resources for the Future  Krupnick et al. 
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revenues hurt business owners and employees, economists do not consider them to be welfare 
effects to the extent that consumers have other recreational options and can obtain substitute 
seafood at little if any additional cost or loss in satisfaction. Instead, to the extent these 
substitutes are more costly or less preferred, there is a loss in consumer surplus (which would be 
considered welfare effects). From the producers’ side, localized labor markets and widespread 
losses in demand mean that, at least in the short term, economic losses could be large and even 
approximate lost revenues (although they could be at least partly offset by programs that hire 
local labor in the cleanup effort). In the longer term, labor and entrepreneurial mobility limit 
losses, but with persistent ecological effects, “loss of one’s way of life” may contribute to large 
economic losses.  
Table 4. Annual Revenues, by Activity and State, $million (2008) 
State  Commercial Fishing*  Coastal Tourism and Recreation** 
Alabama 44  1,400 
Florida (west coast)  123  20,000 
Mississippi 44  2,000 
Texas 176 7,200 
Louisiana 274  3,600 
TOTAL 662  34,200 
* http://www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/st1/commercial/landings/gc_runc.html 
**http://www.ustravel.org/sites/default/files/page/2009/11/Gulf_Oil_Spill_Analysis_Oxford_Economics_710.pdf 
This leaves agriculture, aquaculture, port and transportation route closure, private 
property damage, and employee and nonemployee health effects. For a spill of large enough 
magnitude that gets close enough to shore, human health effects from contact with spill volatiles 
could amount to medium damage, since the population at risk could be large and people place 
high values on avoiding cancer and other types of health effects. Possible deaths or injuries to 
employees in the drilling industry are also part of damages, though (as we discussed elsewhere) 
not necessarily part of external damages. Aquaculture effects could be large where a fish farm is 
at risk. The other categories seem insignificant.  
Natural Resource and Economic Damages from Catastrophic Spills  
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to determine the expected damages from a 
catastrophic deepwater oil spill, prior data on oil spills provide some information on the range 
and worst-case scenario for damages from such a spill. Cohen (1986) analyzed the U.S. Coast 
Guard’s spill data from 1973 to estimate the fraction of oil spill volume that leads to a particular 
impact. For example, 59.7 percent of total spill volume was reported to have an effect on fish and 
the fishing industry (including fin fish, shellfish, sport fishing, commercial fisheries and Resources for the Future  Krupnick et al. 
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hatcheries, and other marine biota), 51.5 percent was reported to have an effect on water supply 
(which includes municipal drinking water and water intake systems for municipalities, industry, 
and agriculture), 16.5 percent was reported to have an effect on birds, and 0.7 percent on 
recreation. Based on these data and estimates of the cost per gallon of each type of impact, 
Cohen (1986) estimated the average natural resource and economic damages of an oil spill to be 
$3.00 per gallon spilled in 1981, or $7.50 in 2010 dollars. This average value, however, tells us 
little about worst-case damages from a catastrophic spill. 
Helton and Penn (1999) examined 30 large spills between 1984 and 1997 for which they 
could obtain natural resource damage payments as well as other measures of financial costs, 
including recovery costs, federal and state trustee costs, scientific assessment, litigation costs, 
third-party claims, and other costs such as “salvage and repair costs, delay and additional 
operating costs, and lost or damaged cargo costs” (Helton and Penn 1999). Although their 
measure of total financial costs is different from the definition of social damages used here (since 
many of these costs are private and internal to the responsible party), they report a range of costs 
from $1 to as much as $937 per gallon in 1990. They further report an average cost of $278 in 
1990, or about $465 in 2009 dollars. The average natural resource damage payments for the 28 
spills for which data on both spill size and natural resource damage payments were available was 
$40.36 per gallon in 1990 (with a range of $0.07 to $375), or about $66.20 in 2009 dollars.31 
These costs are not representative of all spills and instead represent a highly selected group based 
on the availability of natural resource damages (which Helton and Penn note are calculated in 
less than 1 percent of all spills).  
Helton and Penn (1999) based their figures on actual dollars paid. The Exxon Valdez 
natural resource damage compensation was about $1.1 billion, making that spill only the third-
largest natural resource damage estimate on a per-gallon basis. However, a major national survey 
done shortly after the spill (Carson et al. 2003) found that public willingness to pay to avoid a 
similar incident in the future was $2.8 billion to $7.2 billion in 1990, or $4.6 billion to $11.8 
billion in 2009 dollars. Adding an estimated $600 million in economic damages paid to private 
parties (Cohen 2010a), or about $984 million in 2009 dollars, the externalities imposed by the 
Exxon Valdez are estimated to range from $5.6 billion to $12.8 billion, or $509 to $1,163 per 
gallon, in 2009 dollars. This would make the Exxon Valdez the most costly in terms of damage 
caused per gallon for a large spill off U.S. waters to date. 
                                                 
31 These figures are not reported in Helton and Penn (1999); instead, they are calculated from their Tables 1 and 2.  Resources for the Future  Krupnick et al. 
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Based on Cohen’s (1986) average spill damage figure, the natural resource damages from 
the 205.8 million gallons of oil spilled by the Deepwater Horizon would exceed $1.5 billion, but 
based on Helton and Penn (1999) would be $13.6 billion. These figures do not include cleanup 
costs or compensation to private parties that have incurred economic losses. Scaling the Exxon 
Valdez per gallon estimates to the Deepwater Horizon spill would give a damage estimate 
ranging from $105 billion to $239 billion—a figure that includes both natural resource damages 
and economic damages to private parties. This is considered a worst-case estimate of the 
damages caused by a catastrophic spill when we analyze the potential costs and benefits of 
deepwater drilling in Section 5. It is important to emphasize that this is an estimate of external 
social damages—it excludes the private cleanup and containment costs incurred by the industry. 
However, it includes an estimate of total natural resource damages, not just those that are 
ultimately paid for by the responsible parties. 
Assessing Additional Damages 
Although we have focused on oil spills because our central concern is the BP Deepwater 
Horizon event, it is important, perhaps vitally important, for policymakers to be aware of the full 
set of damages that could be affected by new legislative or regulatory actions following this 
event. We mentioned two in the beginning of this paper: (1) substitution to other types of 
extraction or oil supply activities if deepwater drilling is banned or made more expensive; and 
(2) reduction in oil consumption (following any rise in the price of oil) that would have positive 
effects, such as reducing air pollution, congestion, accidents, and other externalities from 
elsewhere in the fuel cycle. This latter class of effects would be no different from those arising 
from a tax placed on oil consumption or production that encourages users of oil (with effects on 
refiners, transporters, and those in other stages of the life cycle) to economize on its use. In 
elaborating on these two pathways below, we also want to consider the further implications of 
price changes on the production and use of alternative fuels to oil, such as natural gas and 
biofuels and, indirectly, even electric vehicles. 
Benefits or Damages from Alternative Extraction Options 
The nonspill-related damages associated with alternative extraction options and 
increasing oil imports can be easily described. Compared with damages from higher stages in the 
life cycle, such damages are trivial. The burning of gasoline, diesel, and other fuels on land in 
land-based extraction activities is probably more damaging to human populations than its use at 
sea, whether in shallow or deep water. Offsetting these effects is greater energy use in extraction 
activities in deepwater than in shallow-water wells or even wells on land. The largest difference 




















imports. Here the extracting country bears any damages from extraction and loading the oil onto 
tankers, the world at large bears the risk of air pollution during the ocean voyage (as well as 
spillage, but this is captured in Table 2), and the receiving country bears some damage once the 
tanker is near or at the coast.  
Benefits or Damages from Changes in Oil Prices on Final Uses  
If oil prices change as a result of regulating deepwater drilling, and these changes are 
passed on to gasoline and diesel fuel as well as other oil products, then this will have effects on 
pollution and, in the transportation sector, on congestion and accidents. In this section we detail 
these damages and, anticipating Section 4, we discuss the extent to which externalities are 
internalized. Basically, all the damages or benefits are considered externalities, but some 
adjustments are made for internalized externalities.  
In 2007, gasoline use accounted for 45 percent of oil consumption, diesel fuel 16 percent, 
industrial uses 24 percent, aircraft 8 percent, and other uses (e.g., home heating fuels) 7 percent 
(see Figure 4). We take the main oil products in turn and briefly discuss damages associated with 
their use. The empirical literature on the price responsiveness of gasoline use is extensive (Small 
and van Dender 2006), but much less is known about the price responsiveness of other oil 
products. Nonetheless, it seems plausible to us that it would be similar to that for gasoline. In this 
case, we can infer damages for all oil use by adding estimates for the individual products and 
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Pollution. Studies of the social costs of oil use (or energy more generally) are an ideal 
place to find such estimates. ORNL-RFF (1996), for example, calculated the social “cost” of oil 
(what we term damages in this paper) used to generate electricity (which is only about 10 percent 
of the U.S. generation mix) in mills per kilowatt hour (mills/kWh). These damages are trivial.  
The recent study by the National Research Council (NRC 2010) used two well-known 
models that together link transportation activities using oil (and other fuels) to a host of damages 
(GREET 2009; APEEP 2006). This study expressed such damages in cents per gallon, averaged 
over the United States, covering the effects of air pollutants on health, recreation (effects on 
visibility), and crops. These effects were attributable to different stages in the transportation life 
cycle, including feedstock (which includes extraction), fuel (which includes refining and 
transport), vehicle manufacturing, and vehicle operation. Differentiation was made by fuel type, 
covering natural gas, electricity, and biofuels of various types.  
NRC (2010, Table 3.3), for 2005, put local pollution damages at 1.34 cents per gasoline 
vehicle mile (this includes a small contribution from upstream emissions leakage during fuel 
extraction, refining, and transportation, though this component is minor because of tight 
regulations). From NRC (2010, Table 3.4), local pollution damages from diesel trucks are 60 
cents per gallon (in this case damages vary with fuel use rather than with miles driven).32 
Turning to carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, each gallon of gasoline combusted produces 
0.0088 ton of CO2.33 The value of the future global climate change damage associated with 
current CO2 emissions is very contentious; for example, estimates are very sensitive to 
assumptions about the rate at which future damages should be discounted, how the risks of 
extreme climate change are modeled, how nonmarket effects (like species loss) are measured, 
and so on. NRC (2010) provided a very wide range for damages, from $5 to $100 per ton of CO2. 
Probably the best discussion of the “social cost of carbon” is a recent interagency report (IAWG 
2010). Based on synthesizing and updating evidence from different studies, that report 
recommended (in 2007 dollars) a central value of $21.40 per ton of CO2 for 2010 (with a range 
for sensitivity analysis of $4.70 to $64.90, depending on different scenarios for discount rates 
and future damages from global warming). We will use the $21.40 figure, which amounts to 19 
cents per gallon of gasoline. From Parry (2010), carbon damages for diesel are 16 percent higher 
per gallon than for gasoline. 
                                                 
32 Local pollution damages are projected to fall quite rapidly, however, because of regulations requiring reductions 
in particulates and SO2 emissions. 
33 For the carbon content of fuels, see http://bioenergy.ornl.gov/papers/misc/energy_conv.html. Note that 1 ton of 
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Other oil products also have carbon and local pollution emissions, which we take to be 
about the same as for diesel, 60 cents per gallon, or $25 per barrel. Unlike highway fuels, other 
petroleum products are not subject to significant excise taxation. And although there are further 
damages associated with air travel, like flight delays, these have not been quantified but would 
likely make little difference to our calculations, given the modest share of aviation fuel in oil use. 
Congestion, accidents, road damage. Automobiles also contribute to highway 
congestion, which represents another damage category (and also an externality because motorists 
do not account for their individual impact on adding to congestion and travel times for other 
drivers). Parry (2010) put the congestion damage at 4.5 cents per mile, averaged across regions 
of the United States and time of day. 
For accidents, Parry (2010) used a value of 3.5 cents per automobile mile, after updating 
prior studies—for example, using the Department of Transportation’s revised assumption about 
the value of a highway fatality ($5.8 million). These damages include injury risks to pedestrians, 
a large portion of medical and property damages borne by third parties, the tax revenue 
component of injury-induced workplace productivity losses, and so on. Other accident costs, like 
injury risks in single-vehicle collisions and forgone take-home wages from productivity losses, 
are viewed as externalities that have been internalized (see below) and so are not counted.  
Unlike cars, heavy trucks also cause significant wear and tear on the road network, given 
that road damage is a rapidly rising function of the axle weight of a vehicle. On the other hand, 
trucks have a much lower fuel economy than cars, which implies a much smaller reduction in 
vehicle miles per gallon of saved fuel, which reduces the congestion and accident benefits. 
Without getting into the details, we simply summarize assumptions in Parry (2010): marginal 
congestion costs 9 cents per truck mile; accidents cost 3 cents per mile; road damage 
externalities cost 5.5 cents per mile.  
Total damages and uninternalized externalities. Adding up the local pollution, 
congestion, and accident damages related to light-duty gasoline vehicles and multiplying by the 
average amount a passenger vehicle on the road is currently driven per gallon of gasoline—22 
miles, according to the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (2008, Table 4.23)—gives a damage 
from these externalities equivalent to about $2.05 per gallon. Not all of the fuel reduction in 
response to higher prices will come from reduced driving, however. Instead, some will come 
from improvements in fuel economy, which to an approximation do not affect these damages, 
though this response will be weaker given the recent tightening of fuel economy standards. 
Based on Parry (2010), we will assume that two-thirds of any price-induced reduction in gasoline 
demand comes from reduced driving, implying a benefit of $1.37 per gallon.  Resources for the Future  Krupnick et al. 
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Adding this benefit to the carbon benefit gives about $1.55 per gallon of gasoline 
reduced. However, from this figure we need to net out current fuel taxes, which effectively 
internalize some of these externalities in the price paid by motorists at the pump. Together, the 
federal and (average) state taxes currently amount to about 40 cents per gallon, leaving an 
(uninternalized) externality benefit of $1.15 per gallon of fuel saving, or about $48 on a barrel-
of-oil equivalent basis.  
Using assumptions (from Parry 2010) for fuel economy (6 miles per gallon), the fraction 
of the price-induced reduction in fuel use attributable to reduced truck driving (50 percent), and 
the current diesel tax (44 cents per gallon) gives an external benefit, net of the fuel tax, of about 
70 cents per gallon of diesel, or $29 on a barrel-of-oil equivalent basis.  
Externalities Related to Oil Import Dependence 
So far we have been considering all the different damage categories and come up with 
specific estimates for them where possible. Just above, we also made adjustments where these 
damages, while externalities, were partly internalized. In discussing energy security, however, 
there logically is not a “damage” that is distinct from an externality. Therefore, in this section we 
use the term externalities and discuss whether they are internalized.  
Various externalities have been associated with the amount of oil imports, as opposed to 
the overall level of domestic oil consumption, including market power, military spending, 
national security and foreign policy implications, and increased risk of macroeconomic 
disruptions. We look at each of these in turn.  
Market power. It has long been recognized among trade economists that, up to a point, a 
country can make itself better off by restricting the imports of a particular product if that country 
has a degree of market or “monopsony” power—that is, ability to influence the world price of 
the imported commodity. In particular, by reducing imports, the country can induce a reduction 
in the world price, which lowers its import bill at the expense of revenues to foreign countries. In 
fact, there is an externality of sorts: in the absence of trade restrictions, imports of the commodity 
would be too high from the domestic country’s perspective, because individual import buyers do 
not take into account their effect on adding to demand, and (incrementally) raising prices for 
other domestic importers. This price effect is complicated, since it depends on how consumers 
and producers of the product throughout the world respond to market pressure from changes in 
domestic consumption. This is especially true for oil because much of the supply comes from 
government-controlled entities. From Leiby (2007), Figure 3, an oil import tariff of about $8 per 
barrel for the United States might appear to be warranted.  Resources for the Future  Krupnick et al. 
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Whether monopsony power really constitutes a valid “externality” that should be factored 
into an economic assessment of oil supply regulations is contentious, however. From a global 
perspective at least, there is no externality, and trade restrictions are harmful. There is no 
externality because as one domestic importer increases expenditures for other domestic importers 
through upward pressure on global prices, these extra expenditures are offset by a revenue gain 
to foreign oil suppliers. And even if a domestic perspective is taken, the issue is still murky 
because any domestic gains from a direct or indirect attempt to enact transfers from foreign 
suppliers to the domestic economy might be offset if it provokes retaliatory measures from oil-
exporting countries. For these reasons, Brown and Huntington (2010) and NRC (2010) assume 
no externality from market power.  
Military spending. It is sometimes argued that military spending to protect oil supplies 
from the Persian Gulf constitutes an additional external cost associated with U.S. oil imports. 
Measuring the amount of spending is not easy, however, because the Department of Defense 
budget is not itemized by region. Moreover, the U.S. military presence in the Middle East has 
other objectives, like promoting democracy and stability in the region, besides safeguarding oil 
production sites and transportation lanes. And to what extent such spending is a variable cost that 
would increase with more oil imports, as opposed to a fixed cost that would not, is also 
somewhat murky. One study by Delucchi and Murphy (2008) put the (variable) costs of oil 
supply protection at about $6 billion to $60 billion a year, or approximately $1.50 to $15 per 
barrel of (all) U.S. oil imports. For the most part, this estimate reflects peacetime spending, 
though it also includes an annualized average of U.S. military expenditures for the two Gulf 
wars. 
Again, however, whether military spending is an externality is open to question. To the 
extent peacetime spending occurs to protect oil supplies, it effectively substitutes for spending 
that would likely have been incurred by private entities. In other words, there may be little, if 
any, net burden on the U.S. economy from oil-related military spending, at least in peacetime. 
NRC (2010, 333), for example, assumes no externality from military spending. 
National security and foreign policy considerations. A frequently heard concern about 
U.S. dependence on foreign oil is that it helps fund governments of oil-exporting nations that are 
hostile to Western interests. Moreover, to the extent that oil profits ultimately end up in the hands 
of terrorist or other unsavory groups, dependence can threaten regional or U.S. national security 
by increasing the risk of terrorist activity (CFR 2006). And revenues may undermine efforts to 
promote good governance. For example, buoyant oil revenues may have made the Russian 
government less concerned about Western sanctions or withdrawal of assistance in response to 
its crackdown on democracy. However, in all these cases, the United States, acting unilaterally at 
least, has little influence over these revenue flows: even a 10 percent reduction in U.S. oil Resources for the Future  Krupnick et al. 
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imports might reduce world oil prices on the order of perhaps 2 percent, which is very small 
when set against the rise in world oil prices over the last decade.34  
Dependence on foreign oil suppliers may also constrain U.S. foreign policy if the 
government believes that oil-producing nations would disrupt the oil market in response to U.S. 
initiatives on, for example, human rights and democratic freedoms. In other words, oil 
dependence may make the United States more congenial to repressive regimes than it otherwise 
would be.  
Although there is a general sense that the nation would be better off if it were less 
dependent on an oil market subject to political manipulation by hostile, autocratic regimes, 
placing some credible value on these benefits is extremely difficult. Therefore, we simply note 
that there is a positive security cost associated with oil imports, and it could be large (CFR 
2006). 
Macroeconomic vulnerability to oil price volatility. For a given total amount of U.S. oil 
consumption, an increase in the share of consumption coming from foreign oil, in response to a 
reduction in domestic oil supply, may increase the risk of oil price shocks because the increase 
boosts the share of world oil supply that comes from unstable regions. In turn, oil price shocks 
lead to losses in GDP. Of U.S. recessions since 1945, 10 of the 11 have been preceded by sharply 
increasing oil prices, and a long tradition of empirical work has found that sharply increasing oil 
prices have a harmful effect on U.S. GDP (see, e.g., discussions in Brown and Yücel 2002, 
Kilian 2008, and Hamilton 2009). As of 2008, approximately half of U.S. oil imports might be 
viewed as coming from unstable regions like Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Iraq, Russia, and Africa 
(see Figure 5). 
If oil consumers can anticipate the size and effects of oil supply disruptions and take 
them into account in inventory decisions, fuel choices, investment in energy conservation, and so 
on, the risk of GDP losses may be internalized. If, however, because of (say) limited information, 
oil consumers underestimate the risks of oil supply disruptions, they may underinvest in oil 
security protection, implying that some portion of oil-related GDP losses is external. Moreover, 
transfers from U.S. consumers to foreign suppliers from oil price shocks could also be viewed as 
an externality. A careful analysis by Brown and Huntington (2010), however, found that these 
                                                 
34 The impact of changes in U.S. oil imports on world oil prices can be inferred from the inverse of the oil import 
supply elasticity, which measures the percentage change in U.S. imports in response to a 1 percent change in world 
oil prices. From Leiby (2007, Figure 3), a possible value for the oil import supply elasticity might be around 5, 

































sources of external costs associated with marginal substitutions of oil imports for domestic oil 
supply were relatively modest, at $2.10 per barrel, with a plausible range of $0.90 to $5.70 per 
barrel (these estimates take into account that only about half of imports are from unstable 
regions.) 
As noted above, each barrel reduction in offshore production increases oil imports by an 
estimated 0.68 barrel. The associated increase in (quantifiable) externalities due to 
macroeconomic vulnerability amounts to about $1.40 (= 0.68 × $2.10) per barrel of reduced 
offshore production. 
Drilling restrictions and national security: a further look. There is a further strategic 
advantage to restricting deepwater drilling that is not considered here, given our focus on oil 
spills. In particular, leaving some oil in the ground could serve to reduce the impact of possible 
future oil price shocks due, for example, to a sudden cutoff in Persian Gulf supplies as a result of 
a radical takeover in Saudi Arabia. This is the reason for maintaining fuel supplies in the 
Strategic Petroleum Reserve. However, this reserve can address only short-term disruptions: the 
supplies could cover U.S. consumption for a few months at most. If, instead, a global oil price Resources for the Future  Krupnick et al. 
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shock were more prolonged, besides damaging the economy, it could also cause logistical 
problems for the military, which runs on oil.  
An argument could therefore be made for leaving some oil reserves untapped in the Gulf 
of Mexico for use in these emergency situations. Unlike the reserves in the North Slope of 
Alaska, which would take years to exploit, given their remote location and the need for laying 
pipelines, oil in the continental shelf of the Gulf of Mexico could be tapped relatively quickly. 
(Oil deposits in the lower 48 states would have been even better, except that they have now been 
largely depleted.)  
Externalities Related to Overall Oil Consumption 
To the extent that reduced production from deepwater drilling leads to a fall in domestic 
oil consumption (as opposed to an increase in other sources of supply), there can be further 
externality benefits. Use of final petroleum products, particularly transportation fuels, is 
associated with additional externalities like pollution and highway congestion. These have 
already been discussed above. Changes in the amount of oil consumption itself can affect the 
overall vulnerability of the economy to oil price shocks, which we discuss below. 
A reduction in domestic consumption (triggered by higher world oil prices) might be a 
positive externality because it would reduce the vulnerability of the U.S. economy to future oil 
price shocks. Again, however, Brown and Huntington (2010) have found the externality modest, 
at $2.80 per barrel of reduced consumption (with a plausible range of $0.20 to $8.70 per barrel).  
Overall Effect 
Now we add up the above estimates of pollution, congestion, and accident damages, 
labeling them externalities, making corrections for whether they are internalized, and adding in 
uninternalized energy security externalities, all on a per barrel basis. Then we weight the 
estimates for gasoline, diesel, and other fuels by their shares of oil use. This gives an overall 
external benefit of $35 per barrel of oil reduced. In turn, multiplying this by the estimated 
fraction (0.23) of reduced offshore production that comes from reduced consumption (as 
opposed to increased supply from other sources) gives an externality gain of $8 per barrel of 
reduced offshore production.  
4. Are External Damages Internalized by Oil Firms?  
Thus far, we have identified numerous damages associated with offshore drilling, many 
of which we have classified as externalities. However, existing liability laws impose on offshore 
oil drilling an expected sanction that equals the probability of causing and being liable for a spill, 
times the amount of all liability payments. The latter includes compensation paid to victims for Resources for the Future  Krupnick et al. 
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the damages they incur as a result of the spill, payments for cleanup costs and natural resource 
damages, penalties paid to government agencies or courts, and legal costs borne by the firm. In 
effect, expected sanctions induce firms to take more care than they might otherwise to prevent 
spills, and in this sense the sanctions serve to internalize some of the external costs. Expected 
market responses may provide a further mechanism for internalization of external damages if a 
firm anticipates a decline in its stock market value if it causes an oil spill (e.g., as investors 
downgrade its performance relative to other firms in the drilling industry).  
The implications of market responses are discussed in detail in Cohen et al. (2011). In 
this section, we provide some broad sense of the extent to which externalities associated with oil 
spills might be internalized through the existing liability system. To the extent they are 
internalized, existing policies are adequate for purposes of deterrence. On the other hand, to the 
extent external costs have not been internalized by responsible parties, firms do not have 
adequate incentives to take the socially desirable level of care in preventing future spills or other 
harmful effects of their drilling operations (Cohen 1992, 2010b). Before analyzing each damage 
category, three important caveats should be noted. First, the question of whether externalities are 
internalized by responsible parties is quite distinct from the question of whether injured parties 
are fully compensated for their losses. The first question pertains to ex ante incentive: do 
responsible parties expect to have to pay for all external damages they cause? The second 
question is one of ex post compensation, which may have little to do with external damages. For 
example, the government might settle natural resource damage claims with responsible parties 
for an amount significantly below the estimated damage in order to avoid a protracted legal 
battle, providing compensation payments that are less than the damages. Or local residents might 
settle their legitimate claims for less than their damages in order to avoid a lengthy legal battle, 
or a responsible party might compensate businesses or residents that were not damaged by the 
spill in order to reduce legal fees and/or to try to reestablish local goodwill.  
Second, even in the (unlikely) event that ex post compensation payments just happen to 
roughly equate with external damages, as discussed at length in the Cohen et al. (2011), firms 
may still underinternalize or overinternalize spill risks. For example, companies may 
misperceive the probability of a catastrophic spill or the magnitude of harm such a spill might 
cause. Even if these risks are appropriately estimated, management might still take risks that are 
not in the best interest of shareholders because of the conflicting objectives of shareholders and 
managers. However, there are market pressures for firms operating in a competitive industry to 
understand the nature and extent of risks as accurately as possible and to maximize stockholder 
value. A further possibility (though not applicable to an industry giant like BP) is that, if a firm 
can declare bankruptcy and/or has inadequate resources to fully absorb all the damages it is 
responsible for under the law, it will not fully internalize these damages (Cohen 1987). This is Resources for the Future  Krupnick et al. 
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particularly important in the case of catastrophic spills, where the damages can easily exceed the 
market value of firms involved in drilling operations (Muehlenbachs et al. 2011). Moreover, a 
firm might believe that because of complex contracts and drilling operations involving several 
major companies, blame will be shifted and some liability will (inappropriately) be apportioned 
to other firms.  
Third, while responsible parties may pay significant monetary fines (whether imposed 
administratively or through a court system), these payments are a transfer of wealth from one 
party to another and do not directly represent internalized externalities. Nevertheless, as 
discussed below, oftentimes government agencies agree to settle with responsible parties for an 
amount based on natural resource damages. In many cases, the government will use those funds 
for ecosystem restoration—but the might simply go to the Treasury.  
Table 5 identifies each of the component damages associated with a catastrophic oil spill 
and summarizes the extent to which these damages might ultimately be internalized. Once again, 
we need to stress the difference between a damage caused by a spill and an externality. Damages 
include all harms—whether they are borne directly by the responsible party, local residents, or 
the public at large. Externalities are only those damages that are borne by third parties who are 
not part of the underlying market transaction. Finally, as we discuss below, the liability system in 
the United States might or might not fully compensate for these externalities. 
Lost Equipment and Oil 
In the case of a catastrophic oil spill, the immediate consequences—including any harm 
caused to an oil rig, the value of lost oil, and so on—are likely to be borne directly by the 
responsible parties. These are private costs and not generally considered externalities. Although 
society cares about these damages because they are wasted resources and reduce economic 
welfare, they are fully internalized by those engaged in deepwater drilling. Thus, monetary 
sanctions (whether through government penalties or by tort actions) do not need to include these 
damages to deter spills (Cohen 1987). 
Injuries and Deaths 
In some cases, there might be injuries or loss of life to rig workers or third parties. The 
externality associated with such losses would include pecuniary burdens to third parties from 
medical costs (e.g., costs to insurance companies or the government under Medicaid) and lost 
productivity (e.g., the loss of tax revenue to the government as a result of forgone wages), as 
well as nonpecuniary burdens, such as pain, suffering, and reduced quality of life. To the extent Resources for the Future  Krupnick et al. 
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tort law permits full compensation of both pecuniary and nonpecuniary losses, these damages are 
likely to be internalized by firms engaged in deepwater drilling. 
 
Table 5. Portion of Oil Spill Externalities Internalized by Responsible Party  
Damage risks to deepwater drilling workers should, in principle, be taken into account by 
workers when they choose to work in oil drilling (which presumably pays higher wages to 
compensate for the higher risk of hazards) versus other occupations. Thus, to the extent labor 
markets are efficient, the risks to workers should be fully internalized ex ante and are not 
Harm 
Portion likely to be 
internalized  Portion not internalized  Notes 
Lost equipment and 
oil 
100%  —  These are generally considered private 
costs 
Workers or others 
injured or killed 
 
100% for third parties; 
100% for workers if labor 
markets are efficient  
—  Compensation may be awarded to 




100% if firm can afford   Any residual that firm 
cannot afford to pay. 
Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund pays for 
costs (up to $1 billion per incident) 
that responsible party is unable (or 
unwilling) to pay, but this might not 
fully internalize costs; 
Government costs 
related to the spill 
Costs related to cleanup and 
containment are 
reimbursable by the 
responsible party under Oil 
Pollution Act (1990) 
Most but perhaps not all 




(lost tourism and 
fishing revenue, 
etc.) 
Partial payment depending 
on liability cap and firm’s 
willingness or ability to pay 
Any residual 
unaccounted for through 
economic damage 
payments 
Given uncertainties in documentation, 
economic damages may be under- or 
overcompensated; 
Nonpecuniary 
losses to victims of 
the spill 
None  100%  Courts have been reluctant to award 
nonpecuniary damages to economic 
victims of oil spills;  
Public health 
damages 
None  100%  Unlikely to be compensated given 
inability to show causal connection to 
individuals; see text 
Residual damage to 
environment 
Partial payment for natural 
resource damages, 
depending on legal standard, 
liability cap, scientific 
evidence, and firm’s 
willingness or ability to pay 
Any residual 
unaccounted for through 
natural resource damage 
payments 
See text Resources for the Future  Krupnick et al. 
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considered externalities. Of course, as discussed in Box 4, if labor markets are not efficient, we 
do not expect these risks to be fully internalized.35  
Cleanup and Containment Costs 
Once oil begins to spill, the firm is legally obligated under the Oil Pollution Act to try to 
contain it from further spillage as well as clean up as much as physically possible. There is no 
dollar cap on liability for cleanup. Efforts might include booms to prevent oil from spreading 
and/or capture it before it comes ashore, spraying chemical dispersants, mopping up beaches, and 
rehabilitating affected wildlife. However, if a firm is unable to pay for the cost of cleanup, funds 
from the Oil Pollution Liability Trust Fund are tapped (Richardson 2010). 
Government Costs Related to the Spill 
If the government steps in to assist, the responsible party is also required to reimburse the 
government’s expenses. Most direct government expenses associated with the cleanup and 
containment activity are reimbursable, but there appear to be some expenses associated with 
spills that are not generally paid for by the responsible party.36 As of October 12, 2010, the U.S. 
Coast Guard’s National Pollution Funds Center is reported to have billed BP $581 million for 
recovery costs related to the Deepwater Horizon spill (GAO 2010). Although most if not all 
government costs associated with the cleanup efforts are thus likely internalized, legal 
investigatory costs and high-level management costs of government agencies (including the 
White House) would not be reimbursed.  
Since not all oil from a large spill is likely to be contained or cleaned up fully, there will 
inevitably be residual harm that might affect both humans (businesses, property values, health, 
and so on) and natural resources (fish, beaches, ecosystems, and the like). Whether the residual 
harm caused by oil that was not cleaned is fully internalized by the responsible party is difficult 
to determine. We consider three separate categories of harm: economic, health, and natural 
resource damage impacts. 
                                                 
35 Paradoxically, to the extent labor markets are efficient and workers are compensated ex post for nonpecuniary 
damages, these payments may exceed any externalities and thus would tend to “overdeter” oil spills. 
36 See Oil Spill Cost and Reimbursement Factsheet http://www.restorethegulf.gov/release/2010/10/13/oil-spill-cost-
and-reimbursement-fact-sheet, October 13, 2010. Resources for the Future  Krupnick et al. 
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 Economic Damages to Businesses and Individuals Harmed by Spill  
From a purely economic welfare perspective, lost profits are the appropriate measure of 
damages to any fishing and tourist industries that lose business following a spill. Whether these 
losses are actually compensated, however, will likely depend on the level of documentation and 
proof the injured parties can bring to the table, as well as any challenges to these claims by the 
responsible party. In fact, legal standards often make it difficult for victims to prove damages, 
and thus many will be undercompensated. For example, as discussed in Box 6, firms that are not 
located near a spill may not be able to establish legal damages even though economic theory 
would recognize their damages as an externality. However, it is also possible that some 
individuals are overcompensated. For example, is it appropriate to attribute all drop-off in 
business from 2009 to the BP spill, when the recession might have affected 2010 business in any 
event? Similarly, we know that there are always fraudulent claims following natural disasters, 
and there have been reports of such claims’ being filed in the BP case. Even if many of these 
claims are weeded out and not paid, there is always an incentive to overstate losses, and some 
will inevitably be paid. On the other hand, the fact that such fraud exists might cause the 
responsible party to be overly strict in requiring documentation, leaving some legitimate claims 
unpaid.  
A related concern is that despite the negative economic impacts in the region, there might 
be offsetting positive benefits elsewhere. For example, tourists who stay away from the Gulf area 
might instead vacation on the Atlantic coast, thereby increasing its economic activity. While the 
hotelier in the Gulf loses, a hotelier in another area gains new business. Further, while the 
responsible party must pay for the losses, it does not receive any credit for the offsetting benefit. 
From a pure “social welfare” standpoint, only direct harms count as welfare losses (unless there 
are distortions in the relevant markets). Thus, compensating those harmed for their losses is 
appropriate from the perspective of internalizing external harms. Said another way, netting out 
the benefits to others outside the Gulf would send an inappropriate signal to firms about their 
future level of care. 
Finally, even if lost business profits are identified through the legal mechanisms 
discussed above, if the firm has reached a liability cap ($1 billion, as set by the Oil Pollution Act 
of 1990), it will not be responsible for compensating for these losses—and the externalities it 
causes will not have been internalized. 
From an economic welfare perspective, if labor markets are efficient, lost income to 
workers laid off in the fishing and tourism industries would not be considered an economic 
damage. Instead, we would expect these workers to receive unemployment compensation and 
ultimately to find employment elsewhere. Nonetheless, workers directly affected in industries Resources for the Future  Krupnick et al. 
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that may receive compensation for lost profits are generally entitled to compensation for lost 
wages.  
Both workers who lose income and people who live near a spill site may suffer 
significant nonpecuniary damages in the form of mental anguish or more severe mental health 
consequences. These losses are not generally recognized by courts as being compensable by 
responsible parties. Thus, to the extent they occur, these externalities are not internalized. 
Public Health and Nonpecuniary Victim Damages 
Residents and/or cleanup workers might be subject to long-term health effects from 
breathing volatile organic compounds or coming into contact with oil. Others could become ill 
eating tainted seafood. If created by a spill, such harms are unlikely to be fully compensated for 
by the responsible party. It is virtually impossible in most cases to attribute a particular 
respiratory illness or cancer case to an oil spill, even if it can be shown that such illnesses are 
statistically likely. Thus, these harms are unlikely to be internalized by the responsible party. 
Individuals who are economically harmed through job or business losses might also 
suffer emotionally. In fact, local community members who are not even economically harmed 
might suffer serious mental health issues following a catastrophic spill. There is evidence of such 
impacts in the case of the Exxon Valdez and other significant spills. However, in the case of oil 
spills, courts have been reluctant to compensate for either mental health care treatment or 
nonpecuniary damages to quality of life to those who are economically harmed or to other 
members of the community. Thus, this appears to be an area where victims are 
undercompensated, and this externality has not been internalized.  
Residual Damage to the Environment 
Finally, there are damages to natural resources themselves. As discussed earlier, damages 
may include both use (e.g., value to beachgoers or recreational anglers) and nonuse values to 
society (e.g., ecosystem). Economists have developed various techniques for estimating the 
monetary value of these nonmarket losses, which are discussed in detail in Box 3 (above). 
Although these methods have been upheld in court decisions and by expert panels of economists, 
they are not without controversy and uncertainties. Thus, inevitably, defense attorneys hire 
economists to argue for lower damages than those estimated by economists hired by the 
government trustees. For example, in the case of the Exxon Valdez, a government-funded study 
conducted around the time of the spill estimated that the lower-bound estimate of the public’s 
willingness to pay to avoid the loss of wildlife from the Valdez spill was $2.8 billion (Carson et 
al. 2003) (see above), considerably more than estimated by Exxon’s experts. Ultimately, the Resources for the Future  Krupnick et al. 
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company and government settled for $1 billion in natural resource damages—a figure most 
likely lower than the true damage. In the case of the BP Gulf Oil spill, a significant portion of 
natural resource damages is likely to be unknown because they occur in deep water, where the 
impacts on the marine ecosystem are largely unknown (see above). Partly because of the 
difficulty, cost, and time to pursue litigation, the government oftentimes pursues “restoration 
costs” in place of valuing natural resource damages themselves. As discussed in Box 4, however, 
restoration costs are generally less than natural resource damages. Thus, in total, a significant 
portion of natural resource damages will likely be uncompensated through the legal process.  
In the case of catastrophic spills, the bottom line is that despite the considerable 
uncertainty over the magnitude of any externalities that remain after the responsible party is 
charged for damages—and there are some areas in which it might pay more than the harm 
caused—overall, significant externalities may not be internalized through payments to injured 
parties. However, it is still possible that the full costs will be internalized if the government 
imposes civil and/or criminal penalties beyond the payments described above. In fact, under the 
Clean Water Act, penalties up to $1,100 per barrel— and $4,300 per barrel in the case of gross 
negligence or willful misconduct—may be assessed. For the BP Gulf oil spill, this could amount 
to $5 billion or $20 billion in fines, an amount that could more than offset any externalities not 
already internalized through the legal process. Note that there is no guarantee the government 
will seek that high a penalty— or succeed in imposing it.  
Example: Damages from the Exxon Valdez Spill 
Cohen (2010a) catalogued both the estimated damages caused by the Exxon Valdez spill 
and the publicly known costs Exxon incurred as a result of the spill. Including government 
penalties, civil settlements, punitive damages, and the cost of cleanup, Exxon paid approximately 
$4.3 billion to $4.4 billion (in 1980 dollars). Of this amount, about $2.1 billion went toward 
cleanup costs, $500 million to $600 million to pay for economic damages to private parties (e.g., 
fisheries), and $1 billion was paid toward natural resource restoration. However, since natural 
resource damages were estimated to range between $2.8 billion and $7.2 billion, the total 
damages caused by the Exxon Valdez were at least $5.5 billion to $9.5 billion—and might be 
higher if one adds additional public health damages and nonpecuniary losses (e.g., quality of life) 
to victims (e.g., cleanup workers, local residents). This is considerably less than Exxon 
ultimately paid. Thus, it appears that on balance, the external costs of the Exxon Valdez spill 
were not fully internalized.  
We close this section by repeating an important caveat to our analysis. Even if the 
responsible party has fully paid for the harm caused by a catastrophic spill, not all injured parties 
may be fully compensated for their harm. Indeed, we have described various instances where Resources for the Future  Krupnick et al. 
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such compensation is unlikely. Thus, for example, even if government penalties offset these 
uncompensated losses, the funds do not necessarily go to the injured parties. From the 
perspective of ensuring that the ex ante incentives of firms are aligned with taking due care, it 
does not matter who ultimately receives the proceeds of any monetary penalty assessed to 
responsible parties. But from a distributional equity perspective, it most certainly matters.  
5. Cost–Benefit Analysis Framework and Its Application  
In this section, we provide a framework for analyzing the costs and benefits of a ban or 
further regulation on deepwater drilling. A cost–benefit analysis considers not only the direct 
cost of the policy (e.g., higher production costs) and the direct benefits (e.g., fewer damages 
from deepwater spills) but also the indirect costs and benefits that are likely to accrue as the 
market adjusts to any ban or new regulation. Thus, we also consider the potential costs and 
benefits of a shift in the oil supply to onshore drilling or to oil shipped from outside the United 
States. Although we have attempted to place dollar values on both the benefits and the damages, 
we caution the reader that these figures are meant to be illustrative and are based on a simplistic 
empirical analysis. To conduct a rigorous cost–benefit analysis would require considerably more 
facts and data—something that is beyond the scope of this paper. Table 6 provides all the 
estimates of benefits and costs for the different scenarios and assumptions detailed below. Note 
that the damages and benefits taken from the discussions above are assumed to be uninternalized 
externalities, so we use the customary terms of benefits and costs. 
Environmental Impacts and Damages from Spills  
Although it was beyond our scope to measure actual damages from the Deepwater 
Horizon spill or speculate about damages from a future spill that regulations would prevent, we 
did set up a taxonomy for categories of impacts and how these impacts map to activities that 
generate or reduce economic value, termed damages. We learned that overall, spills from drilling 
account for very little of the oil found in coastal waters, with most coming from natural seeps 
and, of the anthropogenic sources, from oil-consuming activities (reaching the ocean from rivers 
and urban runoff. An impact that is perhaps surprising is human health effects from volatilization 
of oil. Information to identify the important impacts of deepwater drilling is insufficient, but for 
shallow-water drilling, impacts include fish and invertebrate mortality and contamination, as 
well as shoreline and habitat contamination. As for damages, historical assessments suggest that 
nonuse values are likely to be the largest damage category, followed by losses to society 
associated with seafood contamination, both real and perceived, and possibly the value of human 
health damages associated with breathing volatilized oil compounds. Recreational damages are 
likely to be small because people have other options. For commercial fishing, revenues in all Resources for the Future  Krupnick et al. 
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affected states (including the west coast of Florida and Texas) are about $661 million annually, 
and coastal tourism and recreation bring in $34 billion. But only a small fraction of these 
revenues is affected, and lost revenues are not an appropriate measure of welfare costs. In 
general, welfare costs would be much lower.  
For the purpose of our illustrative cost–benefit analysis, we will use the welfare estimates 
of damages per gallon of oil from the Exxon Valdez, scaled to the size of the Deepwater Horizon 
spill, which leads to estimates ranging from $509 to $1,163 per gallon, or $105 billion to $239 
billion, in 2009 dollars.  
Energy Security 
Economic effects discussed in the literature include market power, military spending, and 
macroeconomic vulnerability to oil price volatility. Only the last is tagged as an external damage, 
at $1.40 per barrel of reduced offshore production (about $0.03 per gallon of oil). Under a ban, 
deepwater production of about 700 million barrels per year (in 2035) would be eliminated, with a 
total energy security externality of about $1 billion per year.  
Changes in Overall Oil Consumption 
If consumption of oil falls because the regulation of deepwater drilling drives up its cost, 
the regulation generates several benefits: reduced pollution, congestion, and road accidents, 
amounting to about $48 per barrel, or $1.15 per gallon of gasoline and about $0.70 per gallon of 
diesel, net of existing fuel taxes. Overall, external benefits are about $35 per barrel of oil 
reduced. With a 23 percent reduction in deepwater oil production and the consequent reduction 
in consumption, the externality benefit of regulation is about $8 per barrel of reduced offshore 
production, or a welfare benefit of about $5.6 billion per year.  
Welfare Costs of Regulation (Regulatory Costs) 
Earlier, we showed that a complete ban on deepwater drilling would result in welfare 
losses no less than $64 billion per year in 2035 but not much difference in intervening years. For 
the less stringent regulation, these costs could be anywhere from zero to $22 billion per year in 
2035, depending on whether the industry would have adopted these technologies in the absence 
of regulation. These estimates for either policy capture minor effects on the world oil price, 
substitutions to imports (68 percent), reductions in domestic consumption (23 percent), and 
increased domestic production elsewhere (5 to 8 percent). Resources for the Future  Krupnick et al. 
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Net Benefits 
A ban on deepwater drilling would reduce the risk of a catastrophic spill from ongoing 
drilling operations in deepwater to zero, but we do not know what effect tighter regulation would 
have on spill probabilities. RFF’s analysis of spill data off the California and Gulf coasts shows 
only two spills in more than 40 years in the range of the Exxon Valdez (one-third the size or 
greater). So, counting the Exxon Valdez and Deepwater Horizon spills gives a probability of one 
very large spill in about 10 years. Of course, deepwater drilling is relatively new, and our longer 
history with large tanker operations and shallow water drilling may understate the probability of 
a major spill in deepwater. However, for purposes of illustration and to arrive at a ballpark 
estimate of the potential costs and benefits of increased regulation of deepwater drilling, we 
assume the base probability to be 1 in 10 years.  
To estimate the benefits of a ban, we assume (1) catastrophic spills are the only type of 
spill we care about (say, because natural assimilative capacity would take care of most of a 
smaller spill); (2) all damages from these spills can be monetized using estimates based on the 
Exxon Valdez experience; (3) all further spills that a ban would prevent would come from 
deepwater drilling; and (4) these avoided spills would be about the size of the Deepwater 
Horizon spill. Given these assumptions, the ban would eliminate one Deepwater Horizon–type 
incident in 10 years. Thus, the annual expected benefit would be the value of avoiding the spill 
divided by 10. The annual benefits can then be compared with the annual costs (because the 
streams of benefits and costs are constant, no present-value calculations are needed). 
The annual costs of a ban are $64 billion in welfare costs plus $1 billion per year in losses 
to energy security ($65 billion). The welfare benefits are $16.1 billion to $29.5 billion annually. 
Given the numbers for benefits provided above, it is immediately apparent that, the huge 
uncertainties of these estimates aside, a ban would not be economic at this probability (net 
benefits of at least negative $35.5 billion in the first year). On the other hand, if in the absence of 
further regulation, we expect one Deepwater Horizon–type spill every four years or less, then a 
ban on deepwater drilling would be justified on a social cost–benefit basis.  
What about a less severe regulation? As noted, a regulation raising extraction costs by 20 
percent would result in at most $22 billion of annual costs, plus an amount (less than $1 billion) 
for the energy security costs. In the best case, if we assume the regulation eliminates large spills 
(the same as a ban, given that we assume away the effect of small spills), then such a regulation 
would be economic only with the higher end of the benefits estimates—with costs of $22 billion 
annually and benefits up to $29.5 billion (but as low as $16.1 billion annually). Based on a 
compensation measure of damages, benefits would be only $5.8 billion per year, so further 
regulation would not be economic. Because the estimate of welfare costs of regulation is highly Resources for the Future  Krupnick et al. 
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uncertain (the range above was the addition of 10 percent to 20 percent of the current costs of 
drilling), let us also consider the case where costs rise only 10 percent. In this case, welfare costs 
are about $11 billion annually (plus energy security costs of under $1 billion). Thus, even at the 
low estimate of welfare benefits ($16.1 billion annually), the regulation would be economic.  
Now, let’s assume that a regulation raising drilling costs by 20 percent still leaves some 
probability of a large spill. To go further, we would need to know the change in spill probability 
associated with this regulation, which we do not. One way to proceed is by using a breakeven 
analysis: we ask how much the probability of a spill would need to change for the benefits to 
equal the costs. Then we can say that any change in probability greater than this benchmark 
would make the regulation economic. The above low estimates of benefits and high estimate of 
costs ($22 billion annually) make it uneconomic even with the dramatic assumption that the ban 
and the less severe regulation have the same effect on spill probability (i.e., each eliminates it). 
Beyond this case, we focus first only on the highest estimate of benefits ($29.5 billion annually). 
In this case, if a 1 in 10 spill probability were reduced by 92 percent or more, the regulation 
would still be economic (have net benefits). If the costs are assumed to be only $11 billion 
instead of $22 billion annually, then the regulation would still be economic (at the highest benefit 
estimate) if the spill probability were reduced by only 50 percent or more. If the benefit estimate 
is very low ($16.1 billion), then this probability rises to about 70 percent or more. The bottom 
line is that to be economic, the regulation would need to drop the large spill probability 
substantially—by more than 50 percent. Needless to say, the results of a detailed study could be 
very different than these back-of-the-envelope calculations.  
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Table 6. Annual Net Welfare Benefits (in billion 2009 dollars per year) of  
Deepwater Drilling Regulation 


























ban  -  100%  $65 $29.5  -$35.5 NA  $16.1  -$48.9 NA 
Increase 







Partial $22  $22 0 92%  ***  ***  *** 





Partial $11  $11 0 50%  $11 0 70% 
100% $11  $29.5  $18.5  NA  $16.1  $5.1  NA 
*Values are upper bounds per year. The actual cost depends on whether the industry would have adopted the risk-
reduction technology absent the regulation. 
**Defined as the minimum percentage decrease in spill probability from a base spill probability of 0.1 that would 
yield positive net benefits. For example, in the second row, the regulation has to be 92% effective, relative to a total 
ban, to have the same costs and benefits. Any effectiveness greater than 92 percent would result in positive net 
benefits. 
*** Benefits are too low to equate to costs, even assuming 100% effectiveness relative to a ban. 
 

























































































5. Summary and Policy Implications 
This paper has focused on building a framework for assessing the costs and benefits of 
further regulating and/or banning deepwater drilling and demonstrating the use of this approach 
for policy analysis. The costs and benefits of such regulation would be measured by the policy-
induced change in the probability distribution of spills of various sizes, times the damages 
associated with such spills, plus any other benefits (or costs) arising from a reallocation of 
economic activity prompted by such regulation. In addition to environmental impacts associated 
with spills, we included impacts associated with oil price changes and substitution to other types 
of oil supplies, as well as energy security. Because the only damages that justify additional 
regulation are those not already internalized (by markets, liability laws, and policy), we have 
tried to sort out this issue. But we did not attempt to quantify the change in probability of an Resources for the Future  Krupnick et al. 
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accident that any regulation would cause (except to reduce the baseline probability, which we 
assumed was 1 in 10, by 100 percent under a ban). Based on Brown (2010), we attempted to 
estimate the welfare costs to the economy of a ban on drilling or a regulation that increased 
deepwater drilling costs by either 10 or 20 percent.  
Our analysis has implications for policies in two important ways. First, we have 
highlighted and provided a comprehensive list of the varied consequences of limiting deepwater 
drilling—some of them perverse. Second, we provided a framework for improving the future 
conduct of cost–benefit analysis to help decide on the policy design that maximizes net benefits 
to society, given that some regulatory action to limit deepwater drilling is to be taken. 
We have argued that limiting deepwater drilling puts in place a chain of events in the 
economy that can offset or augment some of the environmental and other benefits—
uninternalized externalities—associated with this activity. Raising the costs of deepwater drilling 
will make other approaches to obtaining oil (and meeting energy needs with other fuels) more 
attractive and may ultimately raise the price of oil and its products. However, these other energy 
sources have their own negative externalities, such as environmental and health implications and 
energy security implications. These negative externalities offset to some degree the 
corresponding benefits from reducing deepwater extraction. At the same time, any increase in oil 
prices reduces gasoline demand and other uses for oil, which lowers the considerable negative 
health and environmental externalities associated with these activities, reinforcing the social 
benefits of regulations to reduce deepwater drilling. In our view, this use-based reduction in 
negative externalities is the “tail wagging the deepwater drilling dog,” in that we are quite sure 
about the high price the American public pays for its use of oil in transportation and elsewhere 
and much less sure about the price paid for continuing deepwater drilling. We hesitate to add, 
however, that capturing the former benefits through an oil tax would be a far more efficient and 
effective way of reducing these externalities.  
The foregoing points presume that there are uninternalized negative externalities that 
justify regulation. However, we have seen that this situation is not clear cut. Assuming that BP 
and other oil companies will behave differently, based on the Deepwater Horizon accident, a 
case can be made that most, if not all, oil spill damages are now being internalized. This 
internalization comes from the companies’ reassessment of the probabilities of various-sized 
spills, the basically unlimited liability they face for “covered” damages, and the effect of a big 
spill on a company’s stock price and borrowing ability. This assessment is not very strong, 
however: we noted (in Section IV) that some externalities do not appear to be internalized under 
existing liability laws, even as existing laws may provide compensation for some losses that are 
not externalities and thus go beyond deterrence.  Resources for the Future  Krupnick et al. 
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Regarding the improvement in cost–benefit analyses of deepwater drilling regulation, this 
paper has developed a comprehensive and reasonably simple framework for capturing the 
economic costs and benefits of such regulations and demonstrated how it could be applied with 
some preliminary data. This framework is comprehensive enough to also capture any negative 
benefits associated with substituting away from the newly regulated deepwater oil drilling 
toward other fuels, imported oil, or oil from shallow-water or land-based wells. Such a 
framework, if applied in a deliberate and comprehensive way with more detailed data, could help 
government agencies charged with regulating deepwater drilling produce more credible and 
comprehensive regulatory impact analyses and ultimately, better, more efficient regulations. 
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Appendix A. Estimating the Economic Welfare Cost of Deepwater Drilling 
Restrictions 
The economic welfare cost of drilling regulations is obtained from the standard tools used 
by economists. Consider Figure A1, which shows the supply and demand for offshore U.S. oil 
production.  
The height of the supply curve at any given point represents to the costs to U.S. firms 
from producing an extra barrel of oil; that barrel will be produced as long as the prevailing 
market price at least covers this incremental cost. This curve is upward sloping because, in a 
given year, expanding oil production will utilize progressively more costly wells (e.g., rigs that 
are in ultradeepwater and longer distances from the coast). The area under the supply curve, 
between the origin and the amount of oil production, is total costs to firms incurred by supplying 
that level of crude oil output.  
The height of the demand curve in Figure A1 reflects the benefit to domestic oil 
consumers from one extra barrel; that barrel will be sold as long as the price is at or below this 
incremental benefit. This curve is downward sloping, but only slightly, given that domestic 
consumption of offshore oil is small relative to world consumption and therefore has only 
modest implications for the world market price. The area under the demand curve, between the 
origin and the consumption of offshore oil, represents the total benefit to consumers from this 
oil.  
The total net economic benefits from the business-as-usual level of offshore production in 
2035 (2.36 mmbd)—that is, consumer benefits less supply costs—is indicated by the area 
between the demand and supply curves, or area abc.  
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Figure A1. Economic cost of oil drilling restrictions 
 
Intermediate Regulation 
Consider the high-cost, intermediate regulation that raises production costs by 20 percent. 
We take this cost increase as being the same for all units of production.  
The supply curve with this regulation is indicated by the higher upward-sloping curve in 
Figure A1. Given the new equilibrium for the world price ($133.50 per barrel) and offshore oil 
output (2.23 mmbd), the net economic benefit falls to area dec—that is, the reduction in 
economic welfare is given by area deba. This consists of two components. 
First are the extra production costs for the new level of output (compared with the costs 
of producing the same level of output without the regulation). This is the parallelogram adef, 
which has base 2.23 mmbd and height equal to 20 percent of the new equilibrium price ($133.50 
per barrel), or $26.70 per barrel. Aggregating over a year, this cost is $21.7 billion (= 365  2.23 
 26.7 / 1000).  
The second component is area ebf. This reflects the savings in production costs (at the 
new, higher level of cost), less forgone benefits to oil consumers, from the reduction in offshore 
oil production. To calculate this area, we make the (reasonable) approximation that the supply 
curve is linear over the range of oil reductions caused by regulations, implying area ebf is a 
(straight-sided) triangle. From Figure A1 this triangle has base 0.13 mmbd and height $26.70 and 
therefore area (after aggregating over a year) $0.6 billion (= .5  365  0.13  26.7 / 1000). 
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The low-cost intermediate regulation, which raises production costs by 10 percent, is 
calculated in the same way. Here we assume that all prices and quantities are midway between 
those in the baseline case and the case with a 20 percent increase in production costs. For this 
case, the increase in production costs corresponding to area adef has base 2.30 mmbd and height 
equal to 10 percent of the new equilibrium price ($133.40 per barrel), or $13.30 per barrel. 
Aggregating over a year, this cost is $11.2 billion (= 365  2.30 13.3 / 1000). The second 
component corresponding to area ebf has base 0.07 mmbd and height $13.30 and therefore area 
(after aggregating over a year) $0.2 billion (= .5  365  0.07  13.3 / 1000). Summing the 
components gives a (maximum) welfare cost of $11.4 billion. 
In both cases, the above cost estimates should be viewed as upper bounds. This is 
because they assume no technology upgrades in the absence of regulation. In practice, firms are 
likely to improve safety procedures, at least to some extent, since expectations of spill risks have 
been revised upward following the Deepwater Horizon spill. To the extent such technology 
upgrades would have occurred anyway, the effectiveness and costs of new regulations are 
reduced. 
Permanent Ban 
We lack good data on the total costs of offshore oil production. In terms of Figure A1, 
this means that we do not know what the supply curve looks like well to the left of point f. To 
develop a lower-bound cost estimate, we assume that the supply curve is flat from the origin to 
point f—that is, unit costs are all $108.60 per barrel for the first 2.23 mmbd produced. Under this 
assumption, area afec is $63.7 billion (= 2.23  .5 ((137.3 – 106.8) + (.2  113.5))). Adding the 
estimate of area ebf from above gives the total figure of $64.4 billion reported in Table 1. 
This lower bound may substantially understate actual economic costs. Suppose, for 
example, that the first barrel of oil produced costs $53.4 per barrel, or half as much as just 
assumed, and costs per barrel rise linearly up to $108.6 per barrel at a production level of 2.23 
mmbd. Repeating the above calculation, area afec would now amount to $123.3 billion (= 2.23  
.5 ((137.3 – 53.4) + (.2  113.5))).  
 